This article examines how Koreans became industrial workers in the first and second phases of industrialisation on the peninsula: under Japanese colonial rule, 1931-1945, and under the DPRK's post-Korean War heavy industrialisation, [1953][1954][1955][1956][1957][1958][1959][1960]. While the political regimes of the Japanese colony and postcolonial DPRK were different, industrialisation occurred under similar conditions, characterised principally by war, state capitalism and imperialism. Processes of proletarianisation also reveal similarities in the two periods, including the widespread use of forced mobilisation and immobilisation of workers and a bureaucratic apparatus supporting close control of labour. This article contributes to the critique of conventional views about the role of 'free wage labour' during the transition to capitalism.
Introduction
During the twentieth century the Korean peninsula saw three major phases of industrialisation and proletarianisation, each under very different political regimes. The first occurred in the mid to late 1930s under colonial rule as the Japanese empire made northern Korea a forward operating base for its invasion of China. The second was also focused in northern Korea during the post-Korean War period, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea reconstructed its shattered economy and attempted to emulate Stalin's heavy-industry-first policy. The third -and best known -phase occurred in South Korea, beginning in the mid 1960s. Previous work on development on the Korean peninsula has focused almost exclusively on this last phase and the story of South Korea's rapid rise as an 'Asian Tiger', exceptionalising its development as a 'miracle'.
i This paper will instead examine the first two phases of Korean development to find out what can be learnt about the character of industrialisation and proletarianisation in mid-twentieth century East Asia. It will ask the question: how did Korean peasants become workers in the mid-twentieth century? We might assume that the answer to this question is straightforward, but even a cursory examination of the history of the last 200 years shows that the way people have become workers has varied enormously according to time and place.
While the story of North Korea's economic development has been largely overlooked, studies that cross the colonial/postcolonial divide in modern Korean history are even more unusual. Approaching the problem of Korean proletarianisation through a transhistorical study of colonial and postcolonial northern Korea has some potential benefits for our understanding of Third World proletarianisation more generally. First, we can easily compare colonial and postcolonial regimes of industrialisation that were separated by only a short period of time. Second, we can examine two cases in which the state played a particularly clear role in proletarianisation. And third, we can consider the effects of two major wars on the processes of industrialisation and class formation. To summarise: although the political regimes of the Japanese colonial state and the postcolonial DPRK state were very different, industrialisation during these two periods occurred under similar conditions, characterised principally by war, imperialism and state capitalism. Similarities in processes of proletarianisation are therefore also apparent, with a strong tendency toward the forced mobilisation of workers to alleviate labour shortages in new industries or industries that were considered strategically important for war or postwar reconstruction. Likewise, under conditions of high-speed state capitalist development, workers were uprooted suddenly from their rural environments and thrown into dangerous industrial conditions of which they had no previous experience. Resistance to this in both periods often took the form of high worker mobility, which was countered by the state in the form of strong labour discipline and legal sanctions against moving workplace that pushed conditions for workers towards the unfree end of the wage labour spectrum. In the colonial period the new working class also created strong labour movements, but for various reasons this form of resistance was not repeated in the 1950s.
ii
Proletarianisation and Global Labour History
Research on proletarianisation in the twentieth century, particularly in the newly emerging field of 'global labour history', has recognised that the process of class formation has not followed a classical model laid down by England or other western European countries. This research has also shown that forcible mobilisation played a major part in the proletarianisation of peasants in many parts of the world. But as yet there has been little attention paid to the role of the state and war in this process. In particular, the process of proletarianisation in countries where the state either directed or completely dominated the national economy has been overlooked. In the following I will look briefly at how a number of historians and theorists from Marx onwards have approached the issue of proletarianisation outside of Europe.
As is well known, Karl Marx defined the working class created by capitalism as a class that was 'free' in two senses: "neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, etc., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors."
iii In other words, they are both free to sell their labour to an employer and free from owning significant means of production. Thus for Marx the process of proletarianisation is also a double one: of emancipating workers from the bonds of precapitalist societies (slavery, serfdom, guilds) and at the same time of "divorcing the producer from the means of production." Marx is quite clear that this is not a positive story of liberation, as liberal historians would have it, but rather a story of expropriation, "written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire."
iv In chapter 27 of Capital I, Marx goes on to describe the 'classical' form that this expropriation took in England, from the enclosure of agricultural land for sheep grazing, to the appropriation of church, crown and common land by private landowners, to the clearances of great estates. This process created a ready-made army of workers for the new industries of the towns and cities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, creating the conditions in which the worker is subjugated to the capitalist by the "dull compulsion of economic relations." v However, from the start, Marx recognised that this particular English experience of proletarianisation would not necessarily be the model for all others that would surely follow as capitalism spread around the globe. He writes for example, that the "history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods." vi He also recognised that, while the economic relations of nascent capitalism appeared to the worker as "self-evident laws of Nature", vii coercion, and particularly state-backed coercion, were still a key element of capitalist relations of production and the process of proletarianisation:
Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only exceptionally.
In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to the "natural laws of production," .... It is otherwise during the historic genesis of capitalist production. The bourgeoisie, at its rise, wants and uses the power of the state to "regulate" wages, i.e., to force them within the limits suitable for surplus value making, to lengthen the working day and to keep the labourer himself in the normal degree of dependence. Since state capitalism often means that workers are directly exploited and controlled by the state, it has important implications for the wage labour debate and proletarianisation. The forced mobilisation of workers and limitations on their mobility by the state do not negate Marx's notion of capitalist relations of production based on wage labour, but rather represent one of the forms that capitalist wage labour can take, especially in the process of initial industrialisation and proletarianisation, and/or in times of war. Rather than a dichotomy of free and unfree labour, this view sees wage labour under capitalism as existing on a spectrum from relatively free to relatively unfree. Just as under bureaucratic state capitalism the competition between many capitals is displaced from the sub-national level but the competitive drive to accumulate is maintained through inter-state and inter-bloc competition, xxv under forms of state capitalism the labour market is partially or wholly displaced but the fundamental wage labour-capital relation remains as the means by which capital is accumulated.
xxvi
The following section of this article will describe in outline the industrialisation of the northern region of Korea between the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the completion of the DPRK's first five-year plan in 1961. Sections 4 and 5 will then look in detail at the question of proletarianisation, treating the periods of late colonial rule (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) and wartime and post-war DPRK (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) in separate sections.
The industrialisation of northern Korea under colonial and postcolonial regimes, 1931-1961
Japan began its drive to industrialise Korea in the early 1930s under Governor-General Ugaki Kazushige. Close cooperation between the Japanese Government-General in Korea and Japanese conglomerates such as Noguchi Jun's Chisso had already begun to take shape in the late 1920s with the planning of huge hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River and the building of Chisso's enormous chemical plant and company town at Hŭngnam on the east coast of northern Korea. However, it was Japan's expansion into Manchuria in 1931 that really served as impetus for industrialising northern Korea and integrating it into the newly-gained colonial territories of northeastern China.
xxvii Before turning to the scale and character of this industrialisation drive, it is necessary to note the situation of the Korean working class prior to 1931. Large-scale proletarianisation had actually begun in Korea (or the Japanese colony of Chōsen as it was then known) not long after annexation with the land survey carried out by the Japanese between 1910 and 1918. This survey helped to enlarge the landholdings of large landlords and dispossess smallholder peasants, increasing the floating population of landless and destitute peasants. This led, in the 1920s, to the growth of a significant population of wage workers, concentrated especially in the informal sector, but also employed in emerging light industries such as textiles and rubber. xxviii In 1930 Korea was still an overwhelmingly agricultural country where some 80 percent of the adult male population were employed in farming. However, out of a total population of 21 million, 1.16 million were classified as urban wage workers by the Government-General and of these 40.4 percent were day labourers, 27.6 percent were domestic servants while only 3.4 percent were factory workers and 2 percent miners. xxix Thus Korea at the time had the sort of small and largely informal working class often seen as typical of colonised countries or postcolonial societies that have yet to achieve significant industrialisation. problems due to the legacy of the recent war and the division of the peninsula into two hostile states, including the fact that this period saw a significant reversal of the south-north migration of the 1930s, with some 2 million Koreans moving across the 38 th parallel from the north to the south.
However, despite these problems the newly nationalised industries of the DPRK were able to recover and even achieve some growth before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.
xxxvii
The Korean War of 1950-1953 was absolutely devastating to the North Korean economy and to its industrial facilities in particular, which sustained continuous aerial bombardment by the US Air Force for much of the three years. A large proportion of North Korean industry was moved underground in order to continue operating and valuable plant was moved across the border into northern China so that it could be preserved. Although parts of the industrial base were saved in this way, most modern buildings in urban and industrial areas were flattened and so postwar reconstruction meant a literal rebuilding of the built environment of the whole country. Korea, 1946 Korea, -1960 Immediately after liberation most new workers in North Korea were poor peasants attracted by new opportunities in industry, but they were also joined by those who had lost out in the land reforms of 1946: former landlords, middling peasants, merchants and so on. After the Korean War the labour supply suffered from severe restrictions while demand for labour skyrocketed and the state had to find new ways to achieve its ambitious expansion of the working class, a subject we will return to in section 5.
The formation of the north Korean working class I: under colonial rule, 1931-1945
As the industrialisation of Korea began in earnest in the early 1930s, labour scarcity quickly became a problem for the Japanese conglomerates like Chisso who were investing in the colony with the encouragement of the Government-General. xlix In the late 1920s and early 1930s it was specifically unskilled labourers that were needed on big projects like the building of hydroelectric dams and the Hŭngnam chemical complex. Initially industrial labour came voluntarily from the peasant class and the informal proletariat of the towns and cities. But by 1934 the problem had become acute enough for the Government-General to step in and organise the first state-led labour recruitment programme in April of that year. This was called the 'policy to transfer the surplus southern population to the northern provinces' (nansen kajō jinkō hokuisaku) and it was designed to encourage unskilled construction workers to migrate from the agricultural southern provinces (Ch'ungch'ŏng, Chŏlla, and Kyŏngsang) to the north of Korea where industrial development was focused. l However, until the late 1930s, there was no significant coercive mobilisation of workers by the state. During much of the 1930s Korea migrant labour continued to move freely around the peninsula, with workers going to the northern industrial areas for periods and then returning to their rural homes in the south.
With the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the intensification of Japan's colonial industrialisation programme, the Government-General introduced a series of larger and frequently coercive labour mobilisation programmes under the umbrella of the National General Mobilisation Law. According to Brandon Palmer there were three types of labour mobilisation introduced into Korea between 1938 and 1942: company-directed recruitment with state backing (boshū); government-directed recruitment (kan assen); and labour conscription (chōyō). They were brought in in phases but also co-existed and shared some similar features with one another.
li Under the company-directed recruitment system the Government-General gave companies quotas for numbers of workers they could recruit from certain areas. The Government-General also provided help with recruitment on the ground via police stations and government-run labour offices, which frequently took the form of pressure applied to young men and their families. lii However, it appears that this system was both expensive for companies and failed to recruit the required number of workers for Japanese industry. Thus the Japanese state turned to a more interventionist approach with the government-directed system, under which companies could request workers from the Government-General, which would in turn use employment agencies to fill the demands. Under this system recent graduates and skilled workers aged 18 to 40 were required to register with the government and the major employment agencies were nationalised. This system certainly increased the coerciveness of labour recruitment in colonial Korea, with county authorities ordering village heads to provide a certain number of young men for the recruiters. Between 1939 and 1945 a total of 402,053 Korean men were mobilised under government-directed recruitment to work in both Korea and Japan. Of these, the vast majority were recruited for construction, public works, shipyards and defensive fortifications (83 percent), with 10 percent going to mines and only 2.2 percent to factories. liii So this type of mobilisation did not create a great many new factory workers and was mainly directed at providing large numbers of unskilled manual workers for wartime projects, replacing Japanese workers who had been mobilised for the military.
The third and most coercive form of labour mobilisation -labour conscription -was introduced into the Korean colony in 1942, after the start of the Pacific War. As Brandon Palmer writes, "Conscription gave the government full control over all aspects of labour, including the power to bind workers to their jobs. Conscripted labourers were national employees and could not quit or change jobs without government permission." liv Under this system there were two types of conscription: either workers could be recruited (coercively) for a job and fixed in that position for the period of a one or two-year contract, or they could be fixed in their existing job and forbidden from leaving. In fact, within Korea itself conscription usually took the latter form, with whole factories or mines having their workers frozen in position and unable to leave their jobs. lv Thus, conscription consisted of both forcible proletarianisation of men (and some women) from rural Korean villages and severe restrictions on the movement of workers; a major shift towards the unfree end of the wage labour spectrum in the context of war and labour shortages. During the lifetime of this system (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) Koreans were conscripted 526,042 times, with 43,679 being requisitioned to new workplaces within Korea and 260,145 being frozen to their positions, while another 222,082 were sent to work in Japan. lvi One other feature of labour mobilisation that is worth noting is the system of labour passports that the Japanese government established during the war. Under this system workers were issued with two passports, which were required to get a job. One would be held by the employer and the other kept by the worker, thus effectively preventing workers from moving from one workplace to another without the necessary permission.
lvii Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2016.1171707 Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/ These state-led forms of labour recruitment were undoubtedly one of the main routes for proletarianisation during the latter part of the colonial period in Korea. Overall they recruited very large numbers of Koreans , with a total of 928,095 mobilisations under the government-directed and labour conscription systems. To this can be added the much larger number of men and women who were mobilised for temporary public works and construction projects by semi-official organisations such as the Patriotic Units (K: Aegukpan, J: Aikokuhan), amounting to a total of 4,146,098 mobilisations in the period 1938-1945. lviii However, since there are no figures for the recruitment of workers by companies outside of these programmes, it is impossible to make a direct comparison of the numbers of Koreans who became workers via official routes as opposed to other routes that did not involve state intervention or wartime mobilisation. It is also necessary to bear in mind that alongside the role of the state, there were several other important factors pushing rural Koreans to move to industrial areas and get jobs in new industries. These included bad conditions in rural areas, especially during the years 1939-1942, as well as more personal factors such as a desire to leave an oppressive family or to get on in the world and take advantage of opportunities not available in rural Korea.
Overall then, it is a fact that a large proportion of Koreans who became workers in the late colonial period did so via some form of state intervention and that the primary motivation for this intervention was mobilisation for war. A second conclusion is that during this period the process of proletarianisation had a decidedly coercive character, ranging from false enticements and socialmoral pressure at one end to outright kidnapping of young Korean men at the most extreme end. Not only this, but the work which newly-recruited Korean workers performed was often far from the ideal of 'free wage labour', with severe restrictions on the movement of labour, strict labour discipline and other phenomena such as forced savings accounts into which workers had to place all their earnings. lix
The formation of the North Korean working class II: under the DPRK, 1945-1961
In a centralised, bureaucratic state capitalist society like that of the DPRK, where the state takes on the role of capital itself, it stands to reason that the state would be the primary agent in the process of proletarianisation. In fact from the early days of North Korea, even before the official founding of the DPRK in September 1948, it was the avowed aim of the state to proletarianise the whole of Korean society. lx The state did not simply pursue this aim in a passive way by carrying out its programme of industrialisation and waiting for new workers to sign up for jobs in factories or mines. From the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 the DPRK state actively mobilised peasants and other sectors of society to become workers in order to overcome the severe labour shortages it faced. Labour shortages which were primarily caused by the war itself and its devastating aftermath. This demonstrates that the process of proletarianisation in North Korea had something in common with both 1930s colonial Korea and with the other Third World cases discussed by Munslow and Finch: labour supply was a key problem for industrialisation and one that had to be solved by extra-economic means.
This is the accepted version of an article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly. Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V5eBs_krKUk Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/ In the early years between liberation in 1945 and the Korean War the North Korean economy and working class recovered from the ravages of WWII and the chaos that followed liberation, but neither expanded particularly rapidly. In 1947 the emerging North Korean state put in place its first one-year plan and by 1949 industrial output had recovered to its pre-liberation levels. Although the state needed recruit workers for its recovering industries, the land reform of 1946 made this difficult and as yet there were no attempts to mobilise new layers of workers on a mass scale. lxi That changed drastically with the outbreak of the Korean War, which, like other wars, immediately caused both high demand for the production of certain goods and severe labour shortages as men of working age were mobilised for frontline fighting. In 1950 the number of industrial workers in North Korea dropped to 82 percent of the 1949 level, dropping further to 62 percent in 1951 before recovering slightly to 74 percent in 1952. lxii The DPRK state's answer to this problem was the mass mobilisation of most of the North Korean population for the war effort. Of most relevance here are two orders issued by the Military Affairs Commission (Kunsa wiwonhoe) in the first two months of the war: Order no. 6 "On wartime labour" (June 1950) and Order no. 23 "On wartime compulsory labour mobilisation" (July 1950). Labour mobilisation on the basis of these orders was carried out systematically by people's committees and party officials in each county, with the focus on mobilising women, peasants and even boys for work in factories, mines and other industrial facilities. In essence it was a form of labour conscription similar in some ways to the chōyō system used by the Japanese after 1942. Han Sŏng-hun cites the example of Yŏnch'ŏn County in Kangwon Province, where in the early months of the war 12,789 men and 14,812 women were mobilised for compulsory wartime labour duties. lxiii Han also emphasises the way in which the war served as a means of bringing large numbers of women into the industrial workforce and completely changing their attitudes towards wage labour. In the first three months of the war alone 31,366 women joined the industrial workforce in factories and other enterprises. This influx continued throughout the war, with -for example -some 19,000 women being recruited to work in the factories of North Hamgyŏng Province in June 1951. lxiv Although wartime mobilisation had proletarianised many Korean peasants and women and provided a solution for the immediate problem of maintaining production in wartime, it could not overcome the underlying loss of able-bodied and skilled workers to the war. Further causes of the postwar labour shortage were the high demand for labour stemming first from basic reconstruction and then from the heavy industrialisation drive of the five-year plan (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) , and the problem of labour hoarding by enterprises who wanted to keep workers even when they didn't immediately need their labour power. lxv The influx of new workers also brought with it new problems, including a slackening of labour discipline among the workforce and a high level of labour mobility as many workers left their workplaces or switched jobs on a regular basis. Thus, after the armistice in July 1953, the North Korean state was faced with a continuing severe labour shortage and a chaotic situation in the factories.
lxvi
In order to solve the labour shortage problem the DPRK state by and large continued its wartime mass mobilisation policy into the postwar period. Once the multi-year plans were in operation from 1954, the State Planning Commission would centrally calculate the number of workers required in This is the accepted version of an article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly. Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V5eBs_krKUk Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/ each sector of the economy and then the Ministry of Labour would assign the workers to individual enterprises. At the lower level the workers were assigned to their workplaces by the labour department of the local People's Committee (PC). lxvii After the war most new workers entering factories and other industrial work were actually discharged soldiers, so in a sense the wartime troop mobilisation transitioned straight into peacetime labour mobilisation: rather than returning to their villages demobbed soldiers were assigned to workplaces. A second large group of new workers came from the peasant class, who were presumably mobilised by PCs on the orders of the Ministry of Labour. This process must have been aided by the programme of agricultural collectivisation that began in earnest in 1954 and was completed by the end of 1958. Although hard data on this is not currently available, it has been suggested that the combination of small independent farms into large collective farms and the beginnings of mechanisation in the countryside during the mid-1950s helped to create a surplus rural population that the state could channel into industrial production.
lxviii Other smaller groups who provided workers for the postwar reconstruction and industrialisation drive included handicraftsmen, petty traders (whose businesses had usually been lost during the war) and young people newly graduated from school.
lxix Besides discharged soldiers, women and the surplus peasant population, the DPRK state had some other sources of labour in the mid-1950s, especially during the Three-Year Plan focusing on reconstruction when large quantities of unskilled labour were required in the construction sector. One such source was the student and office worker population of the capital and other urban areas who were organised into 'volunteer' work brigades during holiday periods in order to speed up construction. lxx Another source of labour for reconstruction was the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, which remained stationed in North Korea in large numbers until 1958. There was clearly an understanding between the DPRK and People's Republic of China governments that the labour of the troops stationed in North Korea would constitute a large part of China's fraternal aid to its warstricken ally and it seems that Chinese soldiers from the PRC were particularly put to work in rural areas to help re-start agricultural production. lxxi No doubt in the early years of postwar reconstruction, when skilled and experienced workers were not so essential (because many factories were not even running yet) and the level of mechanisation was low, these sources of labour were very useful for the DPRK state.
We know that in the postwar period North Korean workers continued to be assigned to their workplaces by the state rather than participating in a labour market as such, but what of their situation once they were working in a factory, mine or other workplace? As noted above, at the end of the war the state faced a situation of flux in the industrial sector with very high rates of labour mobility as well as many new workers with little or no experience in a modern, industrial workplace. The state had begun to tackle this problem during wartime with the Military Affairs Commission orders mentioned above that prohibited workers from leaving their workplace of their own volition and made absence without leave a criminal offence. Far from relaxing these regulations after the armistice, in the immediate postwar period the DPRK government wrote them into law with the August 31, 1953 Supreme People's Assembly ordinance entitled: "On the prohibition of labourers and office workers from leaving their workplaces of their own accord". This is the accepted version of an article that will be published by Taylor and Francis in Third World Quarterly. Please refer to the published version when citing: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctwq20#.V5eBs_krKUk Accepted Version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22708/
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This ordinance stated clearly that "workers who intend to leave their workplace or move to another workplace must get permission from the workplace manager" and "those who intentionally leave their workplace must be brought to trial and can be sentenced to between 6 months and one year of reformative labour by the People's Court." lxxii These restrictions on the movement of workers were enforced through a system of labour passports (rodong such'ŏp) and worker registers (roryŏk taejang) which were kept by each enterprise, rather similar to those used by the Japanese in the early 1940s. Not only did the enterprise record information about all workers in its worker register, it was also required to investigate a worker's labour passport for five days when hiring a new worker. North Korea's newly proletarianised workers were therefore tied to their workplace and highly dependent on their factory or enterprise manager. 
Conclusion
As the discussions above illustrate, there were significant similarities between the processes of proletarianisation that took place in colonial Korea under Japanese rule and in postcolonial North Korea. In the following I will attempt to highlight both the similarities and the quite important differences between the two periods and then use that comparison to shed some light on the broader question of twentieth century proletarianisation in the developing world. First though, it should be stressed that while the colonial Japanese regime and the DPRK state had much in common in political economic terms, they were not in any sense equivalent political regimes. The fact that one state was founded on imperialism, racism and exploitation while the other claimed to be a government of national liberation ruling in the interests of the Korean masses was not simply a matter of ideology. These differences in political orientation had significant effects in the 'real world' on the behaviour of leaders, bureaucrats and the mass of people who were their subjects. That is to say, it is likely that many Koreans in 1950s North Korea felt they had a stake in the country and its future and wished to contribute to its defence and its postwar recovery. This difference does need to be borne in mind when we assess the coerciveness of labour mobilisation under the two regimes. The different historical context of the two regimes also requires some attention. Most importantly, once the Soviet Union had occupied northern Korea in 1945 it was in a position to impose many of its labour policies on the territory, and the influence of Stalin-era Soviet labour management would continue in the DPRK for many years. Thus, as in many areas of society, labour policy and the processes of proletarianisation in North Korea reveal a complex mixture of influences from the Japanese colonial period and the USSR. Perhaps the most prominent similarity between the types of mobilisation used in colonial and postcolonial North Korea was the use of a state-directed wartime labour conscription system in order to get the required workers for key industries or construction projects. Obviously a key difference lay in the fact that under Japanese state-directed wartime capitalism workers were by and large conscripted by the state to work for private companies, while under the DPRK's bureaucratic state capitalism both recruitment and employment was done by the state as all enterprises were state-owned. In both cases there were also more temporary forms of labour mobilisation through semi-official social organisations such as the Patriotic Units of colonial Korea and the mass organisations of the DPRK such as the Democratic Youth League and the Korean Workers' Party.
In terms of where the new workers came from there were both similarities and differences. In both colonial Korea and postcolonial North Korea the primary source of new workers was undoubtedly the peasant class and particularly young men from rural areas. While there were often significant push factors driving this section of the population to seek work in the new industries and in cities, the severe labour shortages experienced in both periods demonstrate that such factors did not convince enough young men to leave their villages and families behind. Coercion directed against the rural population was therefore seen as a necessity in both colonial and postcolonial Korea. But in the postwar DPRK there was a further factor that seems to have been creating a surplus population in rural areas: the programme of collectivisation that was carried out in the mid 1950s. This is a good demonstration of the more comprehensive power of the state in North Korea, as it was able to both directly conscript new workers and consciously create the conditions under which they were no longer required in the agricultural sector.
In the gendering of proletarianisation there was also a notable difference between colonial Korea and the DPRK. Large numbers of women were mobilised by the Japanese state during wartime for various kinds of work -most infamously for forced military prostitution -but they were not mobilised in large numbers to work in industry and the industrial workforce of late colonial Korea actually became more masculine as the proportion of heavy industry rose. By contrast, under North Korea's wartime and postwar mobilisation women became a crucial segment of the population mobilised for industrial work. Whereas the Japanese turned to Korean men to replace Japanese men who had been sent to fight at the front, the DPRK state had little choice but to turn to Korean women to replace the Korean men who had joined the KPA during the Korean War. This wartime and postwar trend in North Korea was driven by both desperate need, due to a severe shortage of working age men, and by the ideology of the DPRK that strongly asserted the equality of women in many areas of public life. lxxv Another source of new workers used extensively by the North Korean state after the Korean War was demobbed soldiers, who transitioned from wartime military mobilisation to peacetime industrial deployment. This was a source of labourers that had not been available to the Japanese authorities.
The process of proletarianisation did not end with the recruitment of workers to new industrial jobs. Both states faced the problem of labour mobility; essentially a form of passive resistance on the part of workers who voted with their feet when tired of poor conditions or pay. Thus the Japanese colonial state and the DPRK sought ways to fix Korean workers in their positions and prevent them from either moving to other workplaces or returning to their villages and families. And in both cases the solutions were quite similar: they legislated to prevent workers from leaving their workplaces and introduced bureaucratic measures -in the form of labour passports -to restrict their mobility and gather data on all workers under the purview of the state. In fact in this particular area there seems to be very little difference between the approach of the two states and, while it is certain that the DPRK approach to this issue was heavily influenced by Soviet labour law, it is quite possible that some influence also came from practices of the late Japanese colonial period. What is different is that while the fixing of workers in position was a form of wartime conscription under Japanese rule, under the DPRK it only became fully established in law after the end of the Korean War, thus making it a 'normal' rather than 'extraordinary' mode of state-labour relations. Disciplining as well as immobilising the newly-formed workforce was also a common concern of the state in both periods examined here, but this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
In Korea during the period from the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 to the end of the first five-year plan in 1960, a large proportion, possibly even an outright majority, of those who became industrial workers did so through the intervention of the state. This was true across two very different political regimes because the political economies of both these regimes were characterised by states that either dominated and directed capital or took its place entirely. The tendency towards state capitalism, in its different forms, was extremely widespread in the mid-twentieth century and it should not be surprising that otherwise disparate polities should develop similar political-economic structures, especially when we bear in mind that state capitalism was advancing even in industrially developed European countries such as Britain. But two other factors were at work in Korea during this period. First, both the colonial Japanese regime and the DPRK state were practising accelerated catch-up development in northern Korea and direct state intervention was particularly well suited to this sort of development. And second, both regimes were involved in fighting 'total wars' which required mobilisation of the entire population. War then, became the crucial factor in both cases that cemented state control of the economy and motivated the very direct state intervention in the process of creating a new working class.
Marx had already recognised in Capital that the state and coercion were part and parcel of the creation of the working class during the "historic genesis of capitalism", but the implication in his work was that this would sooner or later give way to "the dull compulsion of economic relations". Now, there is ample evidence to argue that proletarianisation has never been a "natural" process led by the expansion of capitalist markets, but rather a process in which the state plays a key role in all societies. Moreover, in mid-twentieth-century developing countries like Korea, wracked by imperialism and total war, the role of the state in proletarianisation would turn out to be far more far-reaching and long-lasting than Marx could have imagined when he was writing in the mid nineteenth century. lxxvi Comparing the case of Korea to other newly-industrialising countries during the same historical period will no doubt provide rich material for further developing our understanding of proletarianisation under conditions of late development.
